The Press Looks at the Political Future of Canada and the United States in the 21st Century--Where Do We Stand, and Where are We Headed (A Canadian Perspective) by Gherson, Giles
Canada-United States Law Journal
Volume 24 | Issue Article 48
January 1998
The Press Looks at the Political Future of Canada
and the United States in the 21st Century--Where
Do We Stand, and Where are We Headed (A
Canadian Perspective)
Giles Gherson
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj
Part of the Transnational Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Canada-United States Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of
Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Giles Gherson, The Press Looks at the Political Future of Canada and the United States in the 21st Century--Where Do We Stand, and Where
are We Headed (A Canadian Perspective), 24 Can.-U.S. L.J. 347 (1998)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol24/iss/48
THE PRESS LOOKS AT THE POLITICAL FUTURE OF
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE 21 CENTURY
- WHERE DO WE STAND, AND WHERE ARE WE HEADED?
(A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE)
Giles Gherson
My assignment was to talk about the political future of Canada and the
United States in the 2 1St century. I have been out of the United States for
about ten years now, so I thought it would be presumptuous to carry on too
far in that direction. Taking the more modest course, I decided to restrict
myself to Canada.
Let me start by saying - and this is my own provocative statement of the
evening, I do not think there is any guarantee that there will be a Canada
through the 21t century. Of course, I hope there will be. I think there ought
to be, but I cannot say with any certainty that midway through the next cen-
tury, Canada, as it is presently configured, will continue to exist as an inde-
pendent country from sea-to-sea-to-sea on the northern half of the North
American continent.
There is my first big admission. I do not know what the political future of
Canada will be in the 21t century, but, before you get me off the stage, I
should tell you that I do not know of anybody who does. That is probably the
big difference between our two countries. On the cusp of the new millen-
nium, the United States leads the "American Century" as the world's single
super-power; its dominant economy; its most dynamic innovator; and its
most influential culture. True, the United States has no shortage of chal-
lenges; high rates of urban crime, a widening income polarization, and acute
environmental degradation, to cite a few. And there is no doubt that, in the
age of big markets and diminished states, national government and politics
seem distant and irrelevant to many Americans raising important questions
about the evolving quality and the nature of the U.S. democracy. Just look at
the appallingly weak voter turnout in the 1996 presidential election. Never-
theless, speaking about the future of U.S. politics in the 21st century, no one
doubts the success or the permanence of the American experiment and the
self-confidence of Americans as a national society.
* Giles Gherson is currently the National Economics Columnist for Southam News
Services in Ottawa, Ontario.
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The touchstones of the American way, individualism and political and
economic freedom, are being copied the world over. But, this sort of confi-
dence is far from evident north of the border. It has to be conceded right off
the bat, and George Grant makes this perfectly clear, that existentialist angst
is almost a Canadian pastime,1 and it has been true all of my adult life. In-
deed, today the real or the presumed threats to Canadian survival are so fa-
miliar that they are almost woven into the Canadian psyche itself. The nag-
ging threat of separation has been with us since the first election of the seces-
sionist Parti Quebecois in Quebec City in 1976. And then, there is the anxi-
ety over being swallowed up by the U.S. giant next door, a danger older than
the Confederation itself. These are the two obvious mainstays.
However, as the century draws to a close, the demands of globalization
and technology are exerting especially acute pressures on Canada. There
could be no question that, as something of an artificial nation, defined by a
small, scattered population strung over a vast and often forbidding territory,
with most citizens living within maybe one hundred miles of the U.S. border,
Canada very much has been defined historically by the legacy of a strong
central government. Not only has this government been a tool of economic
nation-building, much more so than the United States, but it is well reflecting
a Loyalist-Tory tradition dating back to the American Revolution. As tens of
thousands of American settlers loyal to the crown moved north, Canada's
political culture has also been more collectivist and less individualist than the
United States, with a stronger social role for government.
Canada was not forged from revolution, but from a compromise accom-
modation brokered from the center. This is why the big market, small gov-
ernment phenomenon of today's global economy is sharply exacerbating the
strains on the Canadian state, both on the southward pull to North American
economic regulatory and cultural integration, and the outward pull to greater
political decentralization and local autonomy. Indeed, one of Canada's best
known political thinkers, Tom Corsean at Queen's University, recently has
gone so far as to posit the view that Ontario is no longer Canada's traditional
heartland of the nation, a province that always put the nation's welfare at the
core of its political culture but has, in fact, become a North American region-
state.
The big irony of the present state, as it underscores the fragility of the
Canadian experiment, is that, by some measures, the country has not looked
as strong or robust in a long while, which is why my putting its future in
question might be viewed at first blush as kind of eccentric. First of all, the
federal government has not been healthier financially in more than a genera-
l GEORGE GRANT, LAMENT FOR A NATION: THE DEFEAT OF CANADIAN NATIONALISM
(MacMillan of Canada, 1978).
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tion, after decades of appalling budgetary mismanagement manifested by
twenty-eight years of consecutive and mounting annual budgetary deficits,
culminating in a forty-three billion dollar shortfall for 1993-1994. This year
we will see a balanced budget, or probably a small surplus. The forecast, for
as long as the eye can see, is for a string of federal surpluses.
Second, the economy looks poised for several years of rapid growth,
likely the most rapid growth of the G-7 countries. After suffering through
deep recession, then protracted, slow growth for the first half of this decade,
the economy has rebounded sharply. Unemployment, stuck at about ten per-
cent for five years, has now finally fallen below nine percent, hardly a great
number in the United States, but still something about which the Canadians
are proud. West of the Ontario-Quebec border, the unemployment rate is
closer to seven and a half percent.
Third, Quebec separatism appears to be staging one of its periodic re-
treats, after reaching its high point in this latest cycle with a narrow loss in
the 1995 October referendum. A recent slate of opinion polls in Quebec
makes it abundantly clear that Quebeckers are fatigued by years of political
talk focused on national unity and secession, and are increasingly cognizant
of the steep economic cost political uncertainty has exacted on the province.
Below-average economic growth, higher-than-average unemployment, con-
tinuing disinvestment, the relative decline of Montreal from Canada's first
city a generation ago to Canada's poverty capital today, all of that has left an
imprint.
On top of this comes the recent move by Jean Charest, the young, char-
ismatic, highly popular leader of the federal Tory party to seek the leadership
of the Quebec provincial Liberal party and become de facto leader of the
province's federalist political opposition. This has dealt a further psychologi-
cal blow to the separatist forces.
Quebec's Premier, Lucien Bouchard, who only a few months ago was
preparing for a spring election against the disorganized and embattled pro-
vincial Liberals, to be followed, assuming victory, by another referendum on
sovereignty later this year, now is very much on the defensive. An extensive
Montreal Gazette poll a week ago shows that, if an election were held today,
the Liberals under Charest would get fifty percent of the vote, versus thirty-
one percent for the present Parti Quebecois government. In another poll by
the Ekos organization, Quebeckers said they would choose, even at today's
status quo, Canadian federalism over complete independence by a margin of
fifty-nine percent to thirty-one percent.
That is quite a sweeping change over the past six months or so that this
current sharp reversal of fortune for the separatists seems likely to postpone
the Quebec election by a year, while Premier Bouchard waits and hopes for
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Jean Charest's star to slip. For his part, Charest seems certain to be acclaimed
Quebec's Liberal leader at the end of this month. As leader, he will have just
one message, that a Liberal government is the only guarantee against another
divisive referendum on separation, ending, or at least suspending, Quebec's
long period of economic and political uncertainty.
Returning to my main theme, with Canada seemingly about to conquer its
two biggest problems of the last generation, Quebec's independence and
looming Canadian government bankruptcy, and with the economy on a roll,
why does the 21 t century not beacon more brightly? Why is Canada's future
in doubt? Is Canada not a huge success? It is emerging from the 20 th century
with the world's thirty-fifth largest population, the eighth largest economy,
and with the United Nations' seal of approval as having the planet's highest
quality of life for the second year in a row.
The answer, fundamentally, is that the past, or even the present, may not
be prologue. It gets back to the challenges posed by globalization and micro-
chip revolution; the rising power of the market; in this case, a rapidly inte-
grated North American market and the mounting obsolescence of Canada's
national government in this changed environment. As the 2 1S" century ap-
proaches, Canada faces three key challenges to that existence.
The first is the economic challenge, or more precisely, the standard of
living challenge. There is no doubt about the success of the Canadian econ-
omy in this century, delivering, as it has, one of the highest standards of liv-
ing in the world over the last fifty years. But there is also no doubt that, in
relative terms, we are now seeing a pronounced erosion of that success. The
Conference Board of Canada reported last fall, using numbers that are very
close to internal Canadian government findings, that Canada's per capita
income has been sliding steadily against the United States over the last fif-
teen years, and now stands at thirty percent below the comparable U.S. num-
ber. Since this is the most used proxy for standard of living, it suggests that
Canadians are becoming steadily poorer than their cross-border American
cousins. Thirty percent is a shocking and sustainable gap across a relatively
open international border. Already 3.3 million Canadians, more than ten per-
cent of our population, live in the United States. And many are the best and
brightest of our countrymen, who have sought more rewarding opportunities
south of the border. Now the talisman of Canada's income gap is the Cana-
dian dollar. Sure, there are number of technical reasons relating to monetary
policy and cross-border interest rate differentials that partly explain the cur-
rent weak Canadian dollar, now worth about seventy cents on the U.S. dollar.
Canadian authorities for over two years now have proclaimed the dollar's
weakness to be a temporary aberration. But surely it is no coincidence that
the Canadian dollar discount closely mirrors the gap in standard of living or
[Vol. 24.347 1998
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output per person between the two countries. Of course, to a lot of Canadi-
ans, and even many politicians, the seventy-cent dollar is a marvelous bless-
ing.
The decade-old Free Trade Agreement notwithstanding, this provides a
hefty invisible tariff wall, making Canadian exports more competitive in the
United States, then bolstering Canadian exports abroad, and also keeping a
bar up against exports to Canada. As a result, Canada has had a very healthy
merchandise trade deficit ever since the Free Trade Agreement was signed.
But in an increasingly integrated continental market, characterized by inten-
sifying competition for investment and skilled, technologically proficient
people, Canada's flagging standard of living, compared to the United States,
threatens to feed on itself.
The output gap reflects Canada's decidedly anemic productivity perform-
ance since the early 1980s, compared to the United States, and already it
translates into higher U.S. manufacturing wages, higher unemployment lev-
els in the United States, and lower taxes south of the border. In fact, manu-
facturing income is now on average one dollar an hour higher in the United
States compared to Canada. Middle-income Canadian wage earners pay
roughly one-third more than their American counterparts in taxes. And, if the
same percentage of working age Canadians had a job in 1996 as in the
United States, over a million more Canadians would have been working,
soaking up nearly two-thirds of the Canadian unemployment rolls. If Canada
is to survive as an independent country in North America, it will have to
close the widening income gap with the United States, yet this is an issue that
is barely on the political radar screen in Ottawa.
Next is the political challenge, specifically the continued capacity of a
severely atrophied government to play its traditional role as the custodian of
pan-Canadianism, forging and maintaining East-West ties against the south-
ward pull of the United States. In the past, the federal government employed
its tax-and-spend power to support the development of major transnational
transportation and communication systems, as well as a national social safety
net of pensions, unemployment, insurance, public health care, post-secondary
education, and other social services. In recent decades, it has become an arti-
cle of faith among Canadians that the generous national social safety net was
a defining characteristic of a kinder, gentler society north of the forty-ninth
parallel. Of course, over the last twenty-five years, as the pace of economic
growth slowed, unemployment levels climbed, and family income stagnated,
these social programs became far too costly and nearly bankrupted the gov-
ernment, forcing retrenchment in the last five years. Hospital overcrowding,
an overstressed education system, an employment insurance system available
to only thirty-five percent of Ontario's unemployed people, and a declining
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elderly income support system, suggests social services that are no longer a
source of very much pride.
Today, in order to keep its budgetary house in order while paying over
forty billion dollars a year in interest payments on a gargantuan $560 billion
national debt, the impoverished federal government simply cannot be the sort
of activist purveyor of national unifying symbols that it once was.
Let me give you a taste of the scale of the federal government's retreat. In
1994, the federal government's spending on programs and services, all pro-
grams and services, amounted to the equivalent of 17.6% of the country's
economy. This year, program spending will account for just 12%, the lowest
level since the 1940s, at the early years of the welfare state. Putting it another
way, six years ago, Canadian taxpayers got one dollar and twenty-three cents
worth of services for every dollar of taxes they sent to Ottawa. Now they get
about seventy-five cents for every dollar, which basically invites contempt.
No wonder, as public services are scaled back, pared down, and rationalized,
Canadians are losing confidence in government's capacity to withstand the
pressures of globalization.
Adding to the pressure on government is clear evidence that, with pro-
grams and services in decline, Canadian tax rates are seriously out of line
with those in the United States, and are overdue for an across-the-board cut.
Middle class tax relief is clearly a top priority for the Canadian Finance
Minister in coming budgets. Clearly, this will further constrain government
resources.
At the same time, as the federal government finds itself, however un-
willing, in headlong retreat, it is fair to say that there is no longer much of a
political constituency advocating a return to central government activism. In
contrast to the two-party system in the United States, the Canadian Parlia-
ment of today and in the foreseeable future is splintered between regionally
based parties with highly divergent visions of the Canadian state. Facing the
Ontario-based Liberal government in the House of Commons is the western-
based Reform party advocating minimalist national government and greater
political decentralization. The third party is the separatist Bloc Quebecois
from Quebec, with the fourth and fifth parties being the left-wing Democrats
and the depleted remnants of the once-governing Conservatives, now an At-
lantic Canada-based rump.
Underscoring the fragmented pizza-Parliament, as we call it, and the
ebbing political consensus around national institutions, is a new provincial
assertiveness among the big four provinces. Ontario, Quebec, British Colum-
bia, and Alberta are all pressing for stronger provincial authority and less
interference from Ottawa, an alliance that is hard to ignore. Finally, along
with the withering of the post-war consensus around activist government
[Vol. 24.347 1998
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which fostered what my fellow journalist Richard Gwyn has called the Cana-
dian state-nation, is a growing social challenge that cuts to the core of Can-
ada's identity as a distinctive North American society.
In a nutshell, there simply is not much agreement anymore about what
attributes constitute Canadian-ism. Intensifying economic cultural integration
with the United States, the decline of Canadian institutions in the public con-
sciousness, and shifting values among the massive baby-boom generation are
the causes for this disagreement. For instance, there is a lot less of the tradi-
tional Canadian deference to authority, replaced with greater individualism
and rights-consciousness, and the rising demographic wave of immigrants
from non-traditional sources. All of these are recasting the Canadian charac-
ter. Indeed, sociologists increasingly are calling Canada the world's first
post-modem state, partly to reflect the multi-ethnic aspect of Canada, as well
as strong national institutions or shared trades.
None of this is intended to convey dismay or pessimism. In many ways,
the disappearance of the old post-war Canada, the reliable dull place that
Seymour Lipsett used to write about in comparison to the United States, pre-
sents a huge opportunity for the 2 1st century to re-invent a distinctive, pros-
perous, alternative society to the United States on the northern half of the
continent. But, in today's world of shrinking political and economic sover-
eignty, staying free of the U.S. vortex will not be easy, nor even perhaps
worthwhile.
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